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Ahmad Qabil, a Reason to Believe and the New Religious 
Thinking in Iran 
 
Abstract 
Ahmad Qabil (d. 2012) was a mid-ranking cleric who achieved considerable fame in Iran due to his 
foregrounding of reason in his jurisprudential writings, his opposition to the strict “literalist” version of 
sharica law propounded by the authorities in the Islamic Republic, and for his 2004 fatwa which permitted 
women the choice about head covering (hijab). His commitment to reason and justice meant that his 
political and jurisprudential compositions and activities cannot be divorced from each other, rather, they 
developed in symbiotic fashion. Largely ignored by Western scholars, this article examines Qabil’s 
contribution to the so-called “New Religious Thinking” movement in Iran. His writings and activities 
are significant because the reason-driven approach reflects an attempt to navigate a path based on sources 
within the Islamic jurisprudential tradition towards “universal” standards that are common in the West, 
and thereby avoid the accusations of “cultural erosion” through intellectual borrowing from the West.1 
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Introduction 
The “New Religious Thinkers” of Iran are a group of seminarians and lay-religious 
intellectuals who have developed a way of interpreting Islam to meet the challenges of 
modernity, and which in general permit understandings of Islamic scripture that accord 
with gender equality, religious pluralism, and non-discrimination. The roots of the New 
Religious Thinking may be traced to the ideas of the lay-intellectual Abdolkarim 
Soroush, but jurists themselves by the mid-1980s had also started to reflect on the 
trajectory of the Islamic Revolution which overthrew the monarchy of Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi in 1978-9. Of particular interest in this respect was the role of Ayatollah 
                                                        
1 A few names are not transliterated according to the house style because they have appeared with 
regularity in the press, and do not require transliteration. These include Ayatollahs Khomeini, Khamenei, 
Montazeri, and Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. 
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Montazeri, who inserted into the Constitution the theory of wilayat-i faqih 
(guardianship of the jurist), the system of government that provided the Leader of the 
Republic with considerable power. Montazeri was dismissed from his role as 
Khomeini’s successor in 1989, following his criticism of certain policies pursued by 
the authorities, such as the mass executions in jails that were being carried out by the 
Islamic Republic.2 It is noteworthy that Muhsin Kadivar and Ahmad Qabil, two of the 
most significant New Religious Thinkers among the culama, (the seminarians, or 
clerics) emerged from the circle that congregated around Montazeri. 
 Qabil is the subject of this article. 3  He is virtually unknown to Western 
academics, even among those who study contemporary Iran and Islam. However, he is 
a familiar figure among Iranians for three reasons. First, he represents an extreme 
among the reformist culama because of his firm attachment to reason that results in 
some very interesting conclusions on religious and political issues (which will be 
unpacked in due course). Second, he is famous from a purely jurisprudential perspective 
because of a fatwa that he issued in 2004 in which he stated his belief that the hijab was 
desirable, or recommended (mustahabb).4 This stands in contrast to the compulsory 
status of head-covering for women which is strictly enforced by the state. Third, Qabil 
achieved prominence in Iran following his political stand against cAli Khamenei (the 
Supreme Leader of Iran since 1989) whom he publicly accused of corruption and 
tyranny from 2001 onwards. This political stance was the inevitable consequence of 
Qabil’s jurisprudential commitment to reason which dovetailed with his firm 
attachment to justice. The timing of these criticisms is important, for only several years 
after Qabil’s initial criticisms of Khamenei, the Green Movement (junbish-i sabz) 
emerged in Iran, which grew out of mass-protests at the perception that the Presidential 
elections of 2009 were rigged. Qabil was propelled to the forefront of the opposition 
movement, and the regime sought to quell such criticism by arresting him and putting 
him in jail. He refused to be silenced, and it was only a brain tumour and associated 
health problems that finally brought an early end to his life in 2012. 
                                                        
2 Ulrich von Schwerin, The Dissident Mullah: Ayatollah Montazeri and the Struggle for Reform in 
Revolutionary Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), pp. 90-131. Sussan Siavoshi, Montazeri: The Life and 
Thought of Iran’s Revolutionary Ayatollah (Cambridge: University Press, 2017), pp. 103-149. 
3 All the e.books by Qabil cited in this article may be found on his website: 
http://www.ghabel.net/shariat/ (accessed 11.08.2018) 
4 Qabil, Ahkam-i banuvan dar sharicat Muhammadi, p. 56. 
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This article assesses Qabil’s contribution to the New Religious Thinking that 
has spread among Iranian reformist Shici culama. While it is true that New Religious 
Thinking is not specific to the ‘ulamā, this article addresses only one such thinker 
whose background has been within the seminary tradition of Iran. The reformist culama 
among the New Religious Thinkers in Iran have provided a wide and diverse range of 
proposals to reform Islam, so much so that a single article would be insufficient to 
examine all of these ideas in adequate detail. The choice of examining the thought of 
Aḥmad Qabil, as opposed to one of the other thinkers is because his thought has been 
ignored by Western observers of Iran. Aside from passing references to him in a number 
of works dealing with Iran’s reformist thinkers, there has yet to appear any scholarly 
article in English or any other European language that deals with his way of thinking. 
This absence of analytical research in the West about Qabil may be attributable to at 
least two factors. The first is the relative brevity of time since his emergence on the 
religious-political stage, and the second is the difficulty of understanding the language 
of his juristic-theological texts; although written in Persian, many of Qabil’s works are 
heavily loaded with specific terminology, so jurisprudential and theological familiarity 
is necessary for any scholar who is serious about deciphering the meaning of such 
works. Likewise, there is very little secondary literature in Persian that analyses Qabil’s 
life and thought, most probably because he was such a controversial figure that any 
Iranian scholar who desired to publish on Qabil would have had to be extremely careful. 
(One exception is an online discussion of Qabil’s contribution by Mohsen Kadīvar who 
has been based in the USA since 2008).5 As the first work to investigate Aḥmad Qabil, 
this article firstly outlines his life and political involvement in Iran until his untimely 
death in 2012. Subsequently, it provides a breakdown of his works. And finally and 
most importantly, this article analyses the most significant aspects of his 
jurisprudential-theological teachings, using the framework of Qabil’s ideas about the 
sources of jurisprudence (the Qurcan, sayings of the Prophet and Imāms, consensus of 
opinions, and reason), all the while locating them within the general parameters of 
Islamic tradition and the New Religious Thinking in Iran. 
 
                                                        
5 See Kadivar’s detailed biography on his website which details the events leading up to his stay in the 
USA https://en.kadivar.com/sample-page-2/ (accessed 07.08.2018). For Kadivar on Qabil see See 
“Mujāhidat-hā-yi ‘ilmī-yi marhūm Aḥmad Qabil” (مجاهدتهای علمی مرحوم احمد قابل): 




Qabil’s Life and Political Involvement 
 
Aḥmad Qabil was born in 1954, and with a clerical father, it came as no surprise that 
he too pursued a religious education in the Holy city of Mashhad under the guidance of 
Ayatollah Milani. In 1978 he moved to Qom to continue his religious education, and 
once there he was caught up in the opposition to the regime of Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi. He began reading the works of pre-revolutionary religious thinkers,6 including 
non-seminary trained scholars such as ‘Ali Sharicati7 and Mihdi Bazargan (the leader 
of the Freedom Movement), 8 as well as seminarian thinkers among the culama, such as 
Ayatollah Taliqani. 9  Following the revolution, Qabil spent a short spell with the 
Revolutionary Guards (Sipah-i Pasdaran) in Mashhad, which had been set up 
specifically to guard the Islamic nature of the Revolution, and he also spent some time 
at the war-front, where he fought against the Iraqi forces. During the 1980’s Qabil 
returned to his studies in Qom, and whilst there he also served as an interrogator (baz-
porsi) in the Special Clerical Court.10 He also assisted his father in the running of and 
teaching in a seminary in Fariman close to the border with Afghanistan.11 
Whilst in Qum Qabil commenced an association with Ayatollah Montazeri who 
was considered one of the greatest teachers at the level of advanced jurisprudential 
studies (dars-i kharij-i fiqh). In fact, the relationship was not merely a teacher-student 
relationship, rather it resembled a father-son bond which lasted for more than twenty 
years.12 It was Montazeri who declared publicly in 1998 that Qabil was sufficiently 
qualified to issue his own opinions (ijtihad) not only on matters of jurisprudence but 
also in hadith and theology. The association with Montazeri coincided with the period 
                                                        
6 Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 71. 
7 For an overview of cAli Sharicati’s life and thought see cAli Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political 
Biography of cAli Sharicati (second edition, London: I.B. Tauris: 2014). 
8 For an overview of Bazargan see Forough Jahanbakhsh, Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism 
in Iran, 1953-2000 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 80-98. 
9 The life and thought of Ayatollah Taliqani have not been adequately researched in English. The most 
extensive treatment is in Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran (New Jersey: Transaction, 2006), pp. 216-72. 
10 For the Special Clerical Courts see Mirjam Künkler, “The Special Court of the Clergy (dādgāh-e vīzhe-
ye rūḥānīyat) and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran,” in The Rule of Law, Islam, and 
Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, edited by Said Arjomand and Nathan Brown, (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2012), pp. 57-100. Qabil was to be tried in these courts in 2010. 
11 These events are described in Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, pp. 71-85, although the timeline is far from 
clear. 
12Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 66. 
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in which he had commenced a critique of certain policies being pursued by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. In particular, Montazeri had been concerned at the numbers of 
prisoners held in jail and summarily executed in the summer of 1988, and so he had 
sent a letter of concern to Khomeini in July 1988.13 This may well have contributed to 
his “fall from grace” (having been appointed in 1985 as the deputy leader of the regime, 
second only to Khomeini), for in 1989 he was dismissed from office and placed under 
house-arrest. It is in this light that Qabil’s continued support and connection to 
Montazeri should be considered. It might have been all too easy for Qabil to extricate 
himself from his spiritual guide, had he desired to further his education and career 
within the ranks of the culama. However, Qabil’s commitment to truth and the same 
kind of values espoused by Montazeri ensured that he remained faithful to the cause 
that he saw was opposed to tyranny and corruption, and which was combined with the 
Green movement several years later.14 
Qabil’s independent mind surfaced soon after Montazeri’s house arrest, and he 
distanced himself from aspects of the traditional seminarian establishment. This is 
typified by his refusal to wear the robes and turban so often associated with Iran’s Shici 
clerics. Qabil claimed that he cast off the seminarian gown and turban in the summer 
of 1991,15 having worn them since 1975 when he first went to Qum. He offered several 
reasons which explain his actions. First, he pointed to the practical consideration that 
these clothes are cumbersome, especially in the heat of the Iranian summer when many 
                                                        
13  See Ulrich von Schwerin, The Dissident Mullah, p. 109, which comes in a chapter devoted to 
Montazerī’s “fall” within the clerical establishment of the Islamic Republic (pp. 90-131). 
14 For the Green Movement see Hamid Dabashi, The Green Movement in Iran (New Jersey: Transaction, 
2011). Qabil summarised the views and demands of the Green Movement with which he clearly 
sympathised. (See “Mushārakāt-i junbish-i sabz” (Common-points of the Green Movement) in Vasiyat 
bi millat-i Iran (pp. 115-120),  
1. The common demand of the people in the current uprising is nothing other than the rejection 
of tyranny and the verification of the authority of the nation based upon democracy. 
2. The basis of all the laws of the country must be established upon human rights. 
3. The right to freedom of expression. 
4. All the socio-political efforts of the Green Movement of the nation of Iran [must] be in the 
framework of “national unity, and the oneness of the land of Iran”. 
5. The rejection of violence. 
That he was identified with the Green Movement is typified in the following remark by Ishkevari made 
on October 22nd, 2012: 
“In recent years Qabil has also been among the well-known opposition leaders of the Green 
Movement. On this topic too, he was successful and dignified. In following Ayatollah 
Montazerī (his master and leader in jurisprudence, politics, piety and morality) with his 
particular [form of] bravery, he clearly and firmly criticised and battled the political power 
and tyranny of the ruler in relation to religion and the sharī‘a from basically a 
jurisprudential and religious perspective.” (Cited in Yād-nāmeh, p. 324) 
15 “Chira libas-i ruhaniyat-ra kinar guzashtam” (Why I put aside the clerical clothes), in Khud-kamagi, 
p. 95.  
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individuals mill around, travel, drive, and engage in all kinds of energetic activities. 
Second, Qabil claimed that the false pride among most people dressed in clerical 
garments had led to the non-observance of human and Islamic morals in many social 
interactions. Third, Qabil argued that Muhammad and the Imams had not adorned 
themselves in any particular garment, but had worn the same clothes as ordinary people. 
Fourth, Qabil reflected upon a reliable narration from Imam Sadiq that “the best clothes 
in any time are the ordinary clothes of the people of that time,” which he considered a 
proof that wearing non-clerical garments was a legal duty.16  
Despite Qabil’s refusal to wear clerical garment, his attachment to the seminary 
and its learning should not be overlooked. Perhaps Qabil was inspired by the example 
set by Montazeri, who under house arrest, remained steadfast in his duties of guiding 
and teaching in as much as he was allowed to do so. Nevertheless, Qabil’s concern with 
the seminaries in Iran, and their connections with the state must have caused him 
concern. It is to be wondered, for example, if the conflict between Montazeri and 
Khomeini produced an inner turmoil within him. Montazeri was critical of those who 
claimed Khomeini’s legacy, such as ‘Ali Khamenei, and the dispute between two of the 
most senior figures associated with the Islamic revolution provoked the kinds of 
questions about how it was possible to support and endorse the reformist ideas of 
Montazeri on the one hand whilst remaining loyal not only to the to the legacy of 
Khomeini (the Islamic Revolution), but even to the figure of Khomeini.17  Ahmad 
Qabil’s brother Hadi provides a solution to this conundrum that may have a lot of 
resonance among Iranians. He claimed that Aḥmad Qabil accepted Khomeini as the 
leader of the country and regarded him with great respect. However, he insisted that 
Khomeini was not infallible (ma‘sum) and could fall into error,18 that is to say, both 
Qabil s completely rejected the cult of Khomeini. 
Qabil’s first encounter with prison and the state authorities came in 1997. The 
timing of this is significant because it occurred very soon after Montazeri warned 
Khamenei in early 1995 about mixing politics and religion, which was clearly a 
                                                        
16 Ibid, pp. 95-6. 
17 Qabil’s understanding of vilayat needs greater consideration, which cannot be undertaken in the 
parameters of this article. However, his views are set out methodically in “Vilayat-i faqih,” in Fiqh, Kar-
kard-ha va Qabiliyat-ha, pp. 75-96. 
18Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 73. The sentiment is a little strange, seeing as the “orthodox” position is 




rejection of the latter’s attempt to assume the position of marja‘iyat,19 and soon after 
the election of the reformist President, Muhammad Khatami in August 1996. In other 
words, Qabil’s arrest was probably an attempt by the more “conservative” elements of 
the Islamic Republic to fight back against what was being perceived as a challenge to 
their authority. Qabil had been distributing some advice that Montazeri had written for 
the new President when he was arrested by the security forces and taken to Mashhad, 
and he was detained for several days. And then in 2001 he was arrested once more in 
Tehran and taken to the Special Clerical Courts. He spent 125 days in solitary 
confinement before being released on bail, 20 having been accused of acting against 
national security, insulting the Supreme Leader (Khamenei), and spreading propaganda 
against the political system.21 
On release, Qabil moved to Tajikistan, and still undaunted he composed a long 
letter containing virulent criticism of Khamenei, dated 31 May 2005, in which he listed 
seven main points that castigated the Supreme Leader for the misrule of the country. 
The candour and the direct nature of the criticisms are astonishing, and it is to be 
speculated that it was these harsh words more than Qabil’s reformed sharica that tainted 
him in the eyes of the regime. It is worth summarising these seven criticisms and 
provide examples of the language used, if only to give an indication of the nature of the 
letter.22 
The first criticism refers to the “great mistake of our clerics” of claiming the 
right to government without having the requisite knowledge for it, believing that 
jurisprudence is a sufficient qualification to appoint themselves to leadership and 
positions of power and demanding the authority of absolute guardianship (wilayat-i 
mutlaqa).  
The second criticism concerns the internal politics of the Islamic Republic, 
which Qabil claims, had fallen into the trap of the cruel (khushunat-talaban), who 
                                                        
19  Ulrich von Schwerin, The Dissident Mullah, p. 161. The position of Marjac taqlid (source of 
emulation) has traditionally been the highest spiritual rank among Shicas. A Marjac controls a seminary, 
its administration, its curriculum and its finances. As such a Marjac is independent from the state. 
Khamenei, according to many sources, did not hold the requisite educational background to become a 
Marjac. His attempts to secure this position reflected, perhaps, his desire to assume greater spiritual 
standing in Iran and among Shici communities outside of Iran. 
20 Muhammad Sahimi, “Progressive Muslim Scholar and Political Dissident Aḥmad Ghabel: 1954-
2012”,  http://www.payvand.com/news/12/oct/1157.html (accessed 29.08.16) 
21Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 77. 
22  This letter simply entitled نامه به رهبر جمهوری اسالمی ايران (“Letter to the Leader of the Islamic 
Republic”) is available in full on the following site: 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2005/06/050601_ahmad-Qabil-letter.shtml (accessed 2.11.17). 
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eliminated and dishonoured political opposition (including the National Front, the 
Freedom Movement, the Mujahadin-i Khalq and Marxists). Moreover they “drove the 
country down a deep and terrifying gorge of revenge, murder, war-mongering and utter 
insecurity.” He continued, “Didn’t this unlawful bloodshed, and the blood of hundreds 
of other sinless people … [spilt by] the revolutionary courts in the years between 
[13]60-68/1981-1988 point to today’s serious situation?” 
Similarly, the third criticism continued in a similar vein: “During your (twelve 
year) leadership [i.e. Khamenei] the tyranny of the courts of justice and the apparatus 
of justice, information and security has increased more than ever … the opponents of 
your politics have been crushed severely and have faced various infringements of [their] 
individual and public rights.” Qabil offers a number of examples, including the “Harsh, 
illegal and ill-mannered treatment meted out to Ayatollah Montazeri … perpetrated by 
officials from the official judiciary and security services, and those who are connected 
to you [Khamenei].” Qabil continued by pointing out that the use of terror against 
political opponents had led to the habitual practice of terror by governors to solve their 
problems. He also reminded Khamenei that he had accused the reformist press of being 
“the enemy’s base” in 2000-1, which was instrumental in their closure. Qabil mentions 
well known seminarians, journalists and politicians who had been jailed, including 
cAbdollah Nuri, Akbar Ganji, and cAbbas ‘Abdi, which all reflected the lack of 
confidence in the structures associated with the Leadership. His list of accusations 
against Khamenei on this point implicated him in almost all of the controversial issues 
that occurred in Iran during the first decade of the 21st century. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth criticisms are much shorter, and they all concern 
foreign relations. The fourth asks about the “incorrect assumptions made by the great 
leaders of the Islamic Republic” concerning its ability in foreign affairs which led to 
insecurity in the region and internationally, such as the eight-year war with Iraq, and 
the breaking of relations with other nations (including the USA). He also mentions both 
the assistance that had been given to silence various opposition groups located outside 
of Iran, which amounted to aiding and abetting terrorist operations, and the interference 
in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. This short criticism is worthy of further 
consideration because it calls into question not just Khamenei, but also the 
revolutionaries during the early years of the revolution, including Khomeini. Perhaps it 
was for this reason that Qabil did not offer more than three brief paragraphs to expand 
on his initial criticism. The fifth criticism continues the theme of foreign relations. 
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Qabil stated that the consequences of the past twenty-five years of foreign policy were 
beginning to show, and he accused Khamenei of not revealing the reality of Iran’s 
weakness vis-à-vis European powers by promoting propaganda and attempting to 
belittle international powers. In the sixth criticism, Qabil asked Khamenei what role he 
played in provoking the American policy of advocating regime change in Iran which 
had kept Iran in a weak position. Connected with regime change, he pointed out that 
there was a movement within Iran calling for a referendum on the political order, or for 
changing the structure of power within the fundamental laws. The final point contained 
Qabil’s recommendations to reform the system. This included a general pardon for all 
political prisoners, the freedom for all kinds of publications, and a guarantee for the 
security of those who wished to return to Iran from abroad. Subsequently, he requested 
a written statement to guarantee that the programme of the President would be carried 
out, a clear nod to the problems encountered by President Khatami during his two terms 
in office, and whose attempts at creating a civil society were blocked by the more 
conservative individuals within the regime. Finally, he called for invitations to 
international organisations to supervise elections. 
Despite these stinging criticisms, Qabil’s other writings reveal that he chose his 
words with care. Indeed, there is some evidence that at times he was extremely cautious 
in what he said or wrote in public. Aside from Khamenei, Qabil very rarely identified 
any particular individual for criticism. He attempted to preserve common decency and 
respect for free expression of opinion. 23  
Despite his respect for the views of others, Qabil was aware that his own 
opinions were highly controversial and dangerous. And it is perhaps because of this 
that he composed his letter in criticism of Khamenei from the safe haven of Tajikistan, 
and it would not be surprising if he had intended to use his sojourn there as a stepping 
stone to a more permanent move to Europe or North America. According to Hadi Qabil, 
his brother’s aim in going to Tajikistan was to pursue his study and research in Europe 
and North America, and to live there. Aḥmad Qabil appeared to be speaking about such 
aims, and in establishing some sort of research institute outside of Iran when he 
composed sharicat-i ‘aqlani (Rational sharica).24 
                                                        
23 See his comments about maintaining all comments and views on his weblog. Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 248. 
24 Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 66. 
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On returning to Iran for medical reasons in 2006,25  Qabil had his passport 
confiscated which prevented him from leaving his country of birth. 26  Despite his 
previous experiences, he persisted in his criticism of Khamenei, typified in another 
public letter following the arrest of his brother who was a supporter of the reform 
movement. Qabil’s letter of April 2008 accused Khamenei of absolute dictatorship, 
saying, “That Mr. Khamenei insists that nobody’s view is important but his, and that, 
for example, that no one should express any opinion about Iran’s nuclear program is an 
indication of nothing but absolute dictatorship,” and, “I am waiting for the day when 
he [Khamenei] is put on trial.”27 Hadi Qabil was eventually sentenced to 40 months of 
incarceration, defrocking, and a fine of 5,000,000 rials. 
 In June 2009, Qabil issued his “political will” (wasiyat bi millat-i Iran) a thirty 
page essay in which he continued to castigate Khamenei for his damaging leadership 
of Iran.28 He persisted in irritating the “conservatives” in the regime when he published 
an article in November 2009 entitled “A brief critique of the occupation of the 
American Embassy in Iran,”29 in which he claimed Montazeri had also pointed out that 
it was an improper act.30 In December 2009 Montazeri died, and on his way to the 
funeral Qabil was arrested again. He was brought to the Special Clerical Court in May 
2010, this time in chains.31 Having spent 170 days in prison, Qabil was released on July 
1, 2010, after posting bail.32 He continued to antagonise the regime, and in September 
2010 he claimed that groups of prisoners had been executed in Mashhad’s Vakilabad 
prison.33 Unsurprisingly, he was re-arrested a short time later and on December 10, 
2010, Qabil was sentenced to 20 months.34 Whilst in prison, he complained of severe 
headaches and he said that that his eyesight was becoming impaired. His health began 
to fail, and the left side of his body became paralysed, and he was unable to dress 
himself properly.35  Eventually the authorities let him receive medical treatment in 
                                                        
25Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 80. 
26 Muhammad Sahimi, “Progressive Muslim Scholar and Political Dissident Aḥmad Ghabel: 1954-
2012”. See also Aḥmad Qabil, Naqd-i Khud-kāmagī, pp. 139-150. 
27 http://zamaaneh.com/news/2008/04/post_4531.html 
28 The whole document is produced in Waṣīyat bi millat-i Irān, pp. 33-63. 
29 A reference to the capture and taking hostage of 52 American citizens and diplomats in the American 
embassy in Tehran, and who were held for 444 days, from November 4th 1979 – January 20th 1981). 
30  “Naqd-i ijmālī-yi ashghāl-i sifārat-i Ᾱmrīkā dar Irān,” 10 Aban 1388, in Fiqh, kar-kard-hā va 
Qabiliyat-hā, pp.129-142. 
31Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 46. 
32 Sahimi, “Progressive Muslim Scholar”;  
33Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 46. 
34 Sahimi, “Progressive Muslim Scholar”; Yād-nāma-yi Aḥmad Qabil, p. 79. 
35Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 48-9. 
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hospitals outside of Tehran where scans revealed he had a brain tumour. Several 
operations failed to improve his condition, and he passed away on 22nd October, 2012.36 
 
I. Qabil’s Writings 
 
Qabil’s academic writings and speeches have been gathered together and placed on a 
website simply named “ghabel.net”, the contents of which has been prepared and edited 
with the help of fellow New Religious Thinker, Muhsin Kadivar. The main section of 
this website is named Sharicat-i ‘aqlani, or rational sharica. It is in this section that it is 
possible to download Qabil’s books. These consist of the following: 
 
1. A Critique of the Culture of Violence (Political notes, 1375-79 [1996-2000]).37 
2. Islam and Social Security.38 
3. Foundations of the sharica (Discussion on the Basis and Principles of 
Jurisprudence).39 
4. Testament to the Iranian Nation (Political notes and interviews 1388-91 [2009-
2012]).40 
5. Criticism of Stubbornness (Political notes, Reflections and Poetry 1380-88 
[2001-2009]).41 
6.  Worldly Fear and Hopes (Speeches 1383-88 [2004-2009]).42 
7.  Rational sharica (Articles on the Relation between Reason and the Law).43 
8. Jurisprudence, Products and Potentialities (Jurisprudential articles and 
answers to religious questions, 1382-89 [2003-2010]).44 
9. Commands Pertaining to Women in the Mohammadan Law (the non-superiority 
of men, inheritance, the veil, temporary marriage, divorce …).45 
                                                        
36Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, pp. 49-50, 78-9. 
37  Naqd-i farhang-i khushūnat, 3-1381/2002)  نقد فرهنگ خشونت, pp. 376). 
38 Islām va ta’mīn-i ijtamā‘ī, 5-1383/2004)  اسالم و تأمین اجتماعی, pp. 486). 
39 Mabānī-yi sharī‘at, 13-1391/2012) مبانی شریعت, pp. 356). 
40 Wasīyat bi millat-i Irān, 13-1391/2012) وصیت به ملت ایران, pp. 420). 
41 Naqd-i khudkāmagī, 1391/2012/13) نقد خودکامگی, pp. 456). 
42 Bīm va omīdhā-yi dīndārī, 13-1391/2012) بیم و امیدهای دینداری, pp. 283). 
43 Sharī‘at-i ‘aqlānī, 13-1391/2012) شریعت عقالنی, pp. 328). 
44 Fiqh, Kārkard-hā va Qabiliyat, 14-1392/2013)  فقه، کارکرد ها و قابلیتها, pp. 290). 
45 Aḥkām-i bānūvān dar sharī‘at-i Muḥammadī, 14-1392/2013)  احکام بانوان در شریعت محمدی, pp. 228). 
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10. The Commands of Punishment in the Mohammadan sharica (Apostasy, stoning, 
death penalty, temporary detention, capital punishment, unlawful taking of 
confession and judgement).46 
 
In addition to the above books composed by Qabil, the web-site also includes a 
commemorative volume (Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil) which includes useful and 
informative essays and tributes by Iranian reformists about Ahmad Qabil. 
 
 
III. Qabil as a Neo-Muctazili-Shici Thinker 
 
The reason for introducing Qabil as a Neo-Muctazili thinker is because of his 
foregrounding of reason in his writings, whether these are primarily of a political or 
jurisprudential nature. In this respect he resembles the Muctazili thinkers of early Islam 
who favoured reason in their theological discourses, and were to influence the history 
of Shici scholarship, arguably more than the Sunni tradition.47 Reason is one of the four 
sources of Islamic law among then Shici culamā, however, in practice it has been 
marginalised, even among Usuli scholars who have favoured reason in jurisprudential 
studies. This is succinctly stated by Ishkavari, one of the most prominent and well-
known of reformers:  
Human reason too was not accorded much credit in the ejtehād of the Shici 
mujhtahid. When this noble principle was accepted that “ijtihad of the sacred text 
is forbidden (nass),” in practice, rationality and argumentation based upon reason 
and independent human wisdom lost currency and authority.48 
Although reason is paramount within the perspectives of all the so-called “New 
Religious Thinkers” of modern Iran, it is Qabil who has advanced reason beyond all 
traditional parameters. And the few academic observers who have made reference to 
                                                        
46 Aḥkām-i jazā’ī dar sharī‘at-i Muḥammadī, 12-1390/2011) احکام جزایی در شریعت محمدی, pp. 342). 
47 Qabil makes the association between the Mū‘tazīlīs and the Shī‘ī on many occasions in his Sharī‘at-i 
‘aqlānī, see for example, p. 61. For a very basic introduction to Mū‘tazīlī thinking, see W.M. Watt, 
Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), pp. 58-71; idem, The 
Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998), pp. 209-50. Commitment to reason also 
entails a concomitant adherence to justice. And because the Shī‘īs believe that the Imāms were persecuted 
and denied “legitimate” right to rule, believers share with the Mū‘tazīlīs a strong conviction for justice. 
48Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 466. 
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Qabil have also alluded to him as a scholar whose fame rests on this unprecedented 
application of reason. For example, Sussan Siavoshi has remarked that Qabil “made a 
clean break with traditional jurisprudence.”49 
So many research questions emerge when considering Qabil’s thought, such as 
whether his intellectual contribution was really unique or innovative? What role does 
reason play vis-a-vis revelation? And what has been his influence upon Shī‘ī thinking 
within the seminary that makes an investigation of his thought worthwhile? In the 
following however, the focus is upon three aspects of Qabil’s use of reason which 
distinguishes him from other New Religious Thinkers among Iranian culama. Then his 
vision of the role of jurisprudence in modern life is assessed, before reaching final 
conclusions. 
 
A. Qabil and Reason 
 
1). Reason and the Qur’ān 
The fundamental starting point of Qabil’s reformulation of Islam is the correlation 
between the Qur’ān and reason. In this agreement he is concerned to bracket out all 
Qur’anic commands related to worship, as the specific forms that worship takes cannot 
be rationally explained. It is therefore, all non-devotional ayas that Qabil understands 
as inherently reasonable. He cites the narration from Imam Kazim that God has two 
proofs: an internal proof which is reason, and an external proof who are the prophets.50 
His commitment to reason also requires the concomitant belief in justice, which 
necessitates that God rewards people for their good deeds and punishes them for their 
reprehensible ones. This dovetails into the larger Shici and Muctazili traditions 
according to Qabil, which should be understood as his attempt to legitimise his reforms. 
He paraphrases the celebrated Shici scholar Shaykh Tusi (Abu Jacfar Muhammad Ibn 
Hasan al-Tusi – d. 1067), and says, “If a verse of the Qur’ān opposes the guidance of 
the sciences, it is necessary to read (ta’wil) [the verse] in the interest of the guidance 
                                                        
49  Sussan Siavoshi composed an abstract for a conference paper, entitled, “Human reason in 
contemporary reformist Shii jurisprudence: From Montazeri to Kadivar, to Qabel.” The abstract may be 
read in the website for the Association of Iranian Studies:   
https://associationforiranianstudies.org/content/human-reason-contemporary-reformist-shii-
jurisprudence-montazeri-kadivar-qabel (accessed, 23.04.18). 
50 The narration in question is reported in Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, Vol. 1. “Usūl, The Book of Reason and 
Ignorance,” no. 12, (Tehran: World Organisation for Islamic Sciences, 1379/2000-1), p. 71. Cited by 
Qabil in Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 47. 
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[offered by] the sciences, and interpret [the Qur’ān] in harmony with it.”51 The reason 
that the Shici tradition had not followed the advice of al-Tusi was because of the 
distortion of “the exaggerators, [and by] the refutation of invalidators and the 
plagiarism by the ignorant which resulted in practice in the cultural domination of 
closed-hearted ignoramuses and the influence of those who plan to make the law null 
and void or who have cast aside the law from its natural place with excessive force 
through hyperbole and exaggeration…”52 While Qabil’s tirade might be taken by some 
scholars to have been directed at the Akbari school of Twelver Shici thought (which 
emphasised adherence and “literal” acceptance of narrations),53 it is not hard to read the 
above as being directed at current scholarship within the Islamic Republic which prefers 
an approach that does not engage fully with societal changes and developments. 
Qabil’s commitment to reason must be considered within the larger clerical 
trend of the New Religious Thinkers of recent years, and indeed even longer, to 
historicise the Qur’an. According to Muhsin Kadivar, the trend towards understanding 
the Qur’anic revelation through history has been increasing over the past one-hundred 
years.54 However, the New Religious Thinkers have used this interpretive strategy to 
regard many of the Qur’anic commands (ahkam) that are enforced within the Islamic 
Republic as having transcended their applicability. (One of the most controversial cases 
concerned the hijab). 55  But the significance of Qabil among the New Religious 
Thinkers among the culama has been pointed out by Ishkavari who observed that 
Qabil’s “rationalism which appears extreme at times, is a big step, and if it is considered 
positively by the jurists and those who study the sharica, it can really open the 
jurisprudential and interpretive path of change, and make the road and the winding path 
clearer and gentler.” 56  Qabil was one of the very few, like Kadivar, who were 
sufficiently brave to express a rational and reformed historicised version of Islam that 
                                                        
51Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 108. (The citation Qabil gives is al-Rasā’il al-‘ashara, 325). 
52Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 62. 
53 For the Akbarī school see E. Kohlberg, “Aḵbārīyā,” Encyclopædia Iranica, I/7, pp. 716-718; an 
updated version is available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya (accessed on 
07.02.2019). 
54 Mohsen Kadivar, “From traditional Islam to Islam as an End in Itself,” Die Welt des Islams 51 (2001), 
p. 459. 
55 One of the most controversial cases concerns the mandatory nature of the hejab, which was questioned 
publicly in the Berlin Conference of 2000 by Ishkavarī. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Democracy 
in Iran, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 136-172. 
56 From a text written by Ishkavarī, 1 Aban 1391/ 22nd October 2012. In Yad-nama-yi Ahmad Qabil, p. 
322. My emphasis. 
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questioned and challenged the policies and way of ruling as set out by authorities of the 
Islamic Republic. 
A historicised version of Islam and the Qur’an is one of the major themes 
discussed by the New Religious Thinkers, but the approaches of the jurists and 
theologians among them are often different. An example is the thought of Muhammad 
Mujtahid-Shabistari whose most well-known work is called Qiracat-i nabawi az jahan 
(“The Prophetic Reading of the World”). In this short but controversial work, Shabistari 
argued that the Qur’ān was indeed a revelation from God, but its wording reflected the 
experiences and choices of the Prophet Muhammad. Shabistari’s work is littered with 
references to German theologians and philosophers (with whom he presumably read 
whilst in Germany before the revolution), and it is to be wondered if he was influenced 
by “the linguistic turn” during his long sojourn in Germany. In contrast, Qabil’s works 
do not refer to European philosophers or the linguistic turn, which may reflect the fact 
that he did not venture outside of Iran aside from trips in Central Asia and Saudi Arabia. 
57 But as an informed scholar Qabil would have been aware of Shabistari’s work, given 
that Qiracat-i nabawi az jahan was published at a time when he was active in publishing 
his ideas. However, Shabistari’s historicizing of the Qur’anic revelation is typical of 
the New Religious Thinkers, and this he shared in common with Qabil. He advanced 
this historicising perspective, arguing that many of the Qur’anic ahkam must be 
considered as ahkam-i imzaci or “validating commands”. That is to say, many of the 
commands were based on existing tradition, whether among Jewish or Christian 
communities, or among the wise of Mecca or Medina. Qabil remarked, “Islamic 
validating commands are [the same as] customary commands (ahkam-i ‘urfi) since they 
follow the rational ability of humans of that time.” And then he made the significant 
observation that “there is no reason that we should consider obeying the rational ability 
of humans in the present time outside of the commands of the Mohammadan Sharicat, 
and only be content with the rigidity of literal meanings (jumud-i zawahir).”58 In other 
words, the rational consideration of reasonable people should not be considered outside 
of the sharica, as the former corresponds with the divine purpose, the criteria of which 
is justice and reason. 
                                                        
57  As noted by Eshkevarī “The most important point is this, that Qabil was a follower of the 
traditionalists, a follower of Aristotelian reason, and paid virtually no attention to modern logic, 
cognition, or new fields of study … and most probably he was unaware of them.” Yad-nama-yi Ahmad 
Qabil, p. 467. 
58 Qabil, Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 78. 
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Having stressed the need for laws to conform to rational interpretations, Qabil 
argued that this was not a new practice and reflected the compatibility of reason and 
sharica, which existed in the very formative period in the construction of sharica. He 
made a passing reference to two kinds of sharī‘a commands, the fixed (thabit) and the 
changed (mutaghayyir). The first are those commands which have not been changed 
since they were revealed, whereas the second are those that have either been abrogated 
by subsequent Qur’anic verses or have been set aside in the course of history.59 It is the 
second kind of verses that are of interest to Qabil, because he claimed that the 
commands of the sharica that have been changed reflect scientific discoveries in human 
reason. “Replacing contradictory commands with the collective reason of humans in 
the present age … is nothing other than asserting the changeability of these 
commands.”60 
 
2). Reason and the Narrations 
 
Qabil had a deep reverence for the Qur’ān, the hadith and the sayings of the Imams, all 
of which he regarded as ultimately compatible with reason. So deep was his attachment 
to the hadith that he used to boast about his knowledge. According to Ishkavari, “Mr 
Qabil was familiar with the current knowledge of the seminaries but more than anything 
in the seminary he specialised in the science of hadith. One may say that he was an 
expert in this field of knowledge.” He added, “Once, in a speech, he [Qabil] said, ‘If 
there are ten specialists on hadith in Iran who have carefully studied all the hadith, then 
I am one of them.’”61 
 In his re-assessment of sayings and narratives Qabil advocated a scrutiny of 
hadith literature and the sayings of the Imāms. He argued that on some matters the 
realities of scripture remained hidden, and that there were some things that ancient 
people were just not ready to accept since their reason, or their scientific understanding 
had not developed sufficiently for them to comprehend the real meaning of the divine 
message. Qabil cited the Qur’an, “No soul is charged beyond its capacity [to 
                                                        
59 On abrogation in the Qur’an Louay Fatoohi, Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law: A Critical 
Study of the Concept of “Naskh” and its Impact (London: Routledge, 2013). 
60Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 70. Qabil does not expand on this point, perhaps because he assumes his audience 
is aware of the history underlying the issue. More extensive treatment of these kinds of verses is found 
in Mabānī-yi sharī‘at, pp. 218-30.  
61Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 276. 
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comprehend]” [2.33] and “Do not ask about things which, were they disclosed to you, 
would displease you,” [5.101) which justified the tradition of dissimulation (taqqiya), 
a practice that is well-known within Shī‘ī history.62 Qabil even cited a tradition from 
Imam Reza that “The prophet of God died while performing dissimulation.”63 The 
belief that the prophet and the Imams observed dissimulation allowed Qabil to advance 
the idea that human reason and scientific knowledge develops through the ages: 
Raising scientific levels, knowledge and general human experience in the present 
age (in comparison [with the levels of comprehension] in the first two or three 
centuries of the Muhammadan sharica is an example of the readiness of the people 
of this age for comprehending more truths and accepting more advanced subjects. 
In other words, if the peoples’ lack of readiness in the age of God’s prophet and 
the guiding Imāms has been the reason for an absence in explaining some 
commands or has been the cause for the lack of opposition to some current and 
unpopular methods or for the confirmation of other methods, then today the 
necessary readiness exists to explain [both] those hidden commands and the 
opposition of the sharī‘a with unpopular methods.64 
Qabil’s argumentation on this point builds upon the ideas of other New Religious 
Thinkers. Of particular interest is the well-known advice of Imam cAli (collected and 
assembled by Sharīf Rāzī (d. 1015)) found in the text of Nahj al-Balagha concerning 
women. The controversial part of cAli’s sermon reads: “Do not consult women because 
their view is weak and their determination is unstable.” Soroush has recognised the 
problematic nature of the text, and he responded to criticisms by saying that subsequent 
portions of the text attempt to argue why women should not be consulted. He 
subsequently explained, “If Imām ‘Ali reasons with us, he invites us to reason back, to 
use our critical faculties.”65 He also pointed to a sharī‘a principle that holds that maxims 
“speak of their time and thus we need a reason for extending them to other societies or 
times.”66 The same text has been the subject of investigation among the New Religious 
Thinkers among the cleric. Muhsin Kadivar cites this saying of Imam cAli in an article 
                                                        
62 Dissimulation, or taqiya is one of the distinctive practices among Shici communities in history. See 
Louis Medoff, “Taqiya. In Shicism”, Encyclopedia Iranica,  online edition, 2015, available at 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/taqiya-i-shiism (accessed on 01 July 2017) 
63Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 76. 
64Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 77. 
65 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender, p. 239. 
66 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and Gender, p. 225. 
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about women rights and he resolves the discriminatory nature of what he calls “deserts-
based” justice with a method that he calls the “preparatory abrogation”. On the basis of 
the inherent qualities of justice and rationality that he witnesses in the Qur’an, Kadivar 
concludes that the “Lawgiver adopted a policy of gradualism to reach the desired 
conditions ... deserts-based justice was the first half-step and egalitarian justice the 
second.”67 In effect Kadīvar believes cAli’s narration is an impermanent ruling and may 
be abrogated by Qur’anic verses which describe the genderless nature of the single soul 
which is the “origin of male and female humans”. He adds that human souls have duties 
and rights, the foundation of which is equality.68 And the kinds of arguments offered 
by Qabil play on a similar, though not completely identical themes as those presented 
by Soroush and Kadivar, both of whom recognised the positive role played by the 
former in his reformulated version of Islam. 
 
3). Reason and Consensus (Ijmac)  
 
The third source of law within Islamic jurisprudence is consensus (ijmac). Traditionally 
this refers to a source of Shici jurisprudence which reflects the agreement of all scholars 
on a specific ruling. Aḥmad Qabil considered the ijmac of traditional Shici Islam as a 
proof agreed upon by scholars for deducing law only after exhausting interpretations 
and readings offered in the Qur’an, Sunna and sayings and example of the Imāms.69 
However, his own conception of the concept raised it from its comparatively low status 
to one that is on a par with sacred scripture. 
ijmac was not an issue of concern as long as an Imam was alive to offer guidance 
to the community, but the situation changed with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam 
in 941 C.E.. Henceforth it fell to the learned scholars to offer their views on unclear 
topics, which could only represent the probable will of the Hidden Imam. Fearful of 
reaching decisions that might not reflect the general will of all faqihs, the jurists became 
very conservative, and sought to reach a consensus of opinions that was not 
controversial. Qabil cited the pre-revolutionary ideologue Ayatollah Mutahhari 
(d.1979): 
                                                        
67 Mohsen Kadivar, “Revisiting Women’s Rights in Islam” in Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Kari Vogt, Lena 
Larsen & Christian Moe (eds), Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law, p. 227. 
68 Ibid, p. 226. 
69 Aḥmad Qabil, Ma‘bānī-ye sharī‘at, p. 248. 
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The tendency in humans to conform is very strong. Among the jurists this problem 
is [also] strong. One jurist produces an inference on a case, but he does not have 
the bravery to express it. He goes and looks to find whether there are like-minded 
jurists of [his] time with the same opinion. There are few jurists who after going 
and looking and [finding] that no-one has said the same thing, have the bravery to 
declare their fatwas. In other words, the jurist is scared when he sees he is alone 
on the path.70 
Qabil also criticised the practice of jurists to reach decisions that did not conform with 
scientific and empirical human knowledge. He said, “Contemporary human rationality 
does not see the benefit of some of [their] approaches, and the waste of time and 
resources on a path the product of which does not attain its aim is a futile endeavour.”71 
The well-known approach mentioned above refers to the clerics’ penchant for 
caution (ihtiyat),72 which has been mentioned by a number of New Religious Thinkers 
such as Muhsin Kadivar, who criticises those jurists who lean towards traditional 
interpretations, as he comments “Traditional fiqh is very cautious,” typified by jurists 
who have reservations about reaching definitive conclusions that would accord with the 
decisions of the Hidden Imam.73 But the importance of Qabil’s observations lie in the 
recognition that ijmac has the potential to be a dynamic tool that can respond to modern 
challenges. His own understanding of ijmac in fact departed from the traditional view 
that limited its role behind the Qur’ān and Sunna, and the sayings and examples of the 
Imams. In the concluding paragraph to his chapter on ijmac in Mabani-yi shari‘at Qabil 
wrote about the connection between ijmac with the way of the wise (sirat al-cuqala), 
and he equated the proof of the way of the wise with the proof for ejmā‘. This is a very 
important point, for as argued above, Qabil regarded ahkam-i imzaci as validating the 
way of the wise in the prophet’s time, and that the way of the wise of the present 
generation should not fall outside of new interpretations of shari‘a.74 In other words, he 
was arguing that the way of the wise was binding upon the believers even to the extent 
                                                        
70 Aḥmad Qabil, Ma‘bānī-yi sharī‘at, p. 248, citing Ayatollah Muṭahharī, Ta’līm va tarbiyat dar Islām, 
p. 285.He c s the same passage in Sharicat-i caqlani, pp. 87-88. 
71 Aḥmad Qabil, Ma‘bānī-yi sharī‘at, p. 249. 
72 See Vikør Knut, Between God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (London:  Hurst, 2005), p. 
133; Oliver Leman claims that Shaykh Ansārī (d 1864) was instrumental in consolidating the practice of 
caution within contemporary Shī‘ī jurisprudence. See his article “Ansari, Murtada bin Muhammad 
Amin,” in Oliver Leaman (ed), The Biographical Encyclopaedia of Islamic Philosophy (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015). 
73 Mohsen Kadivar, “Human Rights and Intellectual Islam”, p. 59. 
74 Aḥmad Qabil, Ma‘bānī-yi sharī‘at, p. 251. 
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that it may overturn traditions that have existed among the believers for centuries. For 
example, Qabil said, 
If the wise thinkers (cuqala), in agreement with each other at a certain time 
consider [that] the individual penalties are irrational, or not eating pork and not 
drinking alcohol is irrational!! then even according to the law it is necessary to 
follow their opinion, and no kind of practical opposition to the consensus of the 
wise thinkers is permitted…75 
The contrast with other clerics on this point is worth considering. For example, 
Ayatollah Motahharī in the generation prior to Qabil, demonstrated the kind of 
conservatism within jurisprudential circles which is apparent in a discussion about the 
command for abstaining from consuming pork. He outlined that some commands have 
no cause or reason given in the Qur’an, and so the faqīh is obliged to deduce a cause. 
But he seemed reluctant to accept the argument that the definite rational cause is the 
existence of the tapeworm, and he asked rhetorically if this was the only reason for 
observing the prohibition on consuming pork, or if perhaps there was another reason. 
He assumed that there would be doubt and hesitancy in the answer, and so he said: 
We cannot find fault with today’s faqihs when you say [to him], ‘“Reason is a 
proof based on argumentation based on deduction”, so [as a result of] today’s 
discoveries why do you not give a fatwa permitting [the consumption] of pork?’ 
He replies, ‘We ask reason, “Oh reason! Oh learning! Do you have definite proof 
(dalil) that other than this there is nothing else, and nothing will be discovered in 
the future?”’ Or he says, ‘We have discovered this now, perhaps there may also 
be something else.’76 
 
B. Role of Jurisprudence 
 
Qabil’s fame rests mostly on a fatwa on the hejab that he issued in 2004 in which he 
questioned one of the pillars of unquestionable doctrine that upheld the standards of 
morality and authority sought by the Islamic Republic. Namely, he publicly challenged 
                                                        
75  Qabil uses exclamation marks in his text, p. 189-90. 
76 Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, Muqtaḍiyat-i zamān, [Islam and the Necessities of Time] (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 
Sadrā, 1370/1991-2), p. 57. 
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the legitimacy of the state to impose the hejab upon women by declaring his belief in 
the desirability of women wearing a hejab, rather than the mandatory head covering 
enshrined by law. This was the first occasion that a cleric had made such a public 
declaration about the permissibility of non-covering within the Islamic Republic. His 
fatwa is also significant because he issued it based upon traditional jurisprudential 
principles. That is to say, he studied the rulings of past masters, scholars and clerics, 
and concluded that there was absolutely no consensus among them that the hejab should 
be mandatory. This is significant because it reveals that Qabil maintained that despite 
his commitment to reason, there was still a space for traditional jurisprudence is 
determining the various social issues that were of a controversial nature in Iranian 
society. Indeed, in his writings Qabil talks of establishing what amounts to a think-tank 
which would include jurists like Qabil himself, but also scholars from across the 
humanities to investigate and analyse problems and issues that emerge in society. In 
fact, like all New Religious Thinkers, he was convinced of the positive role that jurists 
could play in Shici circles, but he refrained from the kind of conclusion drawn by 
Kadivar, that the space, domain or areas covered by the sharī‘a  would decrease over 
time, as the role played by reason serves to deepen faith. 
One of his main jurisprudential arguments was to contrast the principle of rational 
permission (isalat-i ibahat-i ‘aqlani), which in effect allows believers to employ their 
own reason to decide on particular issues. (The classic example being his fatwa on the 
hijab, which in effect returned agency on the issue to women themselves). This is 
contrasted with what Qabil considered to be the situation in the Islamic Republic, where 
the state encouraged the principle of prohibition (isalat-i hazr), which rejected the 
possibility that individuals could determine acts for themselves. And associated with 
how the state promoted certain juristic approaches was the way that the Islamic 
Republic supported a religious culture that was based on sorrow and sadness, typified 
by the mourning linked with the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, that was utilised to 
generate popular sentiment for the war against Iraq during the 1980’s. Qabil, however, 
rejected such a religious culture, and critiqued the promotion of sadness and sorrow.77 
 
Conclusion 
                                                        
77 Qabil discusses this issue in greater depth in Nigāh-i ijmālī bi shādī va ghamm dar mutūn-i sharī‘at 




Qabil died in 2012 at the age of 58, which by Iranian clerical standards is premature; it 
is an age when most scholars have yet to pen their major, mature contributions. 
Nevertheless, his influence was certainly profound among the New Religious Thinkers. 
The collection of remembrances of him, published after his death, reads like a who’s 
who of major reformers, and includes contributions from Muhammad Khatami, 
Soroush, the family of Ayatollah Montazeri, Kadivar and Ishkavari. In addition, his 
standing is also reflected in the fact that the regime regarded him as a serious threat to 
security and public order, which was why he was arrested and tried by the Special 
Clerical Courts in 2010. It is for his intellectual contribution to Islamic studies in 
general and jurisprudence in particular which future generations of scholars will 
remember him. Qabil’s writings raise a number of interesting issues which require full 
investigation, although some of these are considered briefly below. 
The first major research question that emerges from a study of Qabil’s thought 
concerns his perspective on the compatibility of reason and revelation, and in particular, 
his conviction that much of the Qur’an needs to be comprehended in a historical light, 
as many of the commands are validating (ahkam-i imzaci) and specific to the 
community founded by the Prophet. And as such, Qabil considered that the human 
discovery of the sharī‘a is unending; he said, “What I have understood … is this: that 
on all principles and secondary aspects of the law, the basis and proof of reason is 
ongoing (jari).”78 His aim in such a system of law was to ensure that the sharī‘a 
remained up to date with contemporary standards and thinkers, based upon the criteria 
of justice and reason. Of course, this was a challenge to those in Iran who considered 
the sharica a fixed and permanent body of law, enshrined as such within the constitution, 
such as the laws concerning the hejab. Qabil’s challenge, like that of the other New 
Religious Thinkers, concerned the thorny issue of who possessed the power to issue 
opinions, set “norms” of behaviour and recommendations related to the sharica. Qabil 
believed there was a crucial role for the jurists in Iran, but he did not see this task as 
one that would be isolated from specialists in related academic fields of study. He was 
of the opinion that the jurists would offer ethical guidance within the framework of a 
study group, or think-tank.79  It is of interest that Qabil resembles the other New 
                                                        
78Sharicat-i caqlani, p. 49. 
79 Qabil remarked, “I attempted to establish an organisation that assembled various disciplines within the 
humanities and position it alongside theologians, interpreters [of sacred scripts] and jurists in order to 
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Religious Thinkers in that he placed greater stress on an ethical worldview, or on the 
aims of the sharī‘a (maqasid al- sharica). But he did not go as far as some of the thinkers 
such as Muhsin Kadivar who envisages a deepening of faith within a more restricted 
and limited range of jurisprudence.80 Likewise his reform accepted the traditional view 
of revelation, and he did not even discuss the kinds of ideas of Muhammad’s 
involvement in the revelatory process that is advanced by Shabistari. 
Qabil’s radical contribution lay in the extent to which he saw reason as 
compatible with revelation, and it may even be argued with some justification that 
Qabil’s reason forces revelation, or at least, received interpretations of revelation, into 
new territory. His ideas about consuming pork and imbibing alcohol are examples of 
this. Interesting as these arguments are, there is an element of contradiction in Qabil’s 
ideas on this point, as Mohsen Kadivar has indicated, such actions are considered in 
jurisprudence as semi-devotional rituals (shibh-i manasik), 81  and Qabil himself 
admitted that often reason cannot fathom the wisdom behind acts of devotion. 
 The second question that springs to mind is related to the practicability of 
applying Qabil’s philosophy to the Islamic Republic. Ishkavari’s assessment of Qabil  
that “his rationalism … appears extreme at times”82 suggests the difficulty of applying 
the kind of philosophy that he espoused to contemporary Iran. Whilst many of Qabil’s 
positions dovetail neatly into the kinds of rights enshrined within universal human 
rights as they are understood in the West (gender equality, religious pluralism, abolition 
of slavery, and an end to all forms of discrimination) it would be problematic to apply 
such a philosophy wholesale into those parts of Iranian society which are more 
traditional and patriarchal, let alone the seminary culture of places such as Mashhad 
and Qum. 
A second research question, and related to the above discussion, is how the 
Islamic Republic might look if Qabil’s ideas were to serve as a foundation for a new 
interpretations of sharī‘a law. His distinction between Qur’anic verses on devotion 
which reason cannot fathom, and the rest of the verses which are fully compatible with 
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80 Mohsen Kadivar. “From traditional Islam to Islam as an end in itself,” p. 483. 
81 See Muḥsin Kadīvar, “Intizār az dīn va naw andīshī-yi dīn”. Available at 
https://kadivar.com/?p=16093. Accessed 11.08.2018. 




reason, suggest a religious secularity which might resemble the ways in which religion 
is considered in Western Europe and the USA. It is unclear how such a religious 
secularity would play out in modern Iran where state sponsored religiosity has been the 
norm for several generations. Certainly, much would change under Qabil’s ideal form 
of society with, for example, a deregulated sartorial culture, rules pertaining to reform 
the age of marriage that come more in line with Western norms, and greater gender 
equality on a host of other issues, including inheritance and child custody. In addition 
to this, Qabil was keen to promote a religious culture of happiness rather than one of 
sorrow, which might impact specific devotional activities and rituals in Iran, such as 
rawda khani (or lamenting the deaths of those of the holy family at Karbala). 
Nevertheless, he was not completely iconoclastic, and it is possible to see how other 
Iranian religious and secular festivals could continue under his reformulation of Islam. 
A more rigorous analysis of the works of the “dissident” clerics in Iran would reveal 
the deep fissures that exist within the seminaries. Qabil’s untimely death leaves such 
intriguing questions unanswered. 
Third, it is interesting to speculate on the legacy that Qabil left, and in particular 
whether it has had an impact on the seminaries in Iran or among the New Religious 
Thinkers. Although Qabil may have been ahead of his time, his commitment to reason 
and justice continues to inspire the New Religious Thinkers, as it offers an illustration 
of how the sharī‘a may provide an open and democratic system that responds 
adequately to the challenges of modern life. Certainly, Qabil’s example of living his 
theoretical perspectives, whether it is the refusal to wear the seminarian gown and 
turban, or whether it is composing stinging critiques of the regime, is perpetuated by 
the likes of Kadivar. Moreover, it is to be wondered whether Qabil’s famous fatwa 
regarding the desirability of the hejab has in any way contributed to the recent 
movement, the White Wednesday campaign initiated by Masih Alinejad, to give 
women the choice about head covering.83 At the very least his fatwa has ensured that 
the issue of the hejab has remained a topic of debate within Iranian communities. Qabil 
is certainly a pivotal figure among the New Religious Thinkers in modern Iran, worthy 
of study independent of other thinkers with whom there are marked differences. 
                                                        
83 Masih Alinejad’s campaign is described in her autobiography, The Wind in My Hair (London: Virago, 
2018). See also her Facebook page: my stealthy freedom ایران در زنان یواشکی آزادی . 
